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I will argue that the best explanation of one important kind of intractable disagreement about
reasons for action—namely, the disagreement that defines the entire history of moral philosophy—
includes the fact that realism about reasons is false. By realism about reasons, I will mean the view that
what an agent has reason to do is “mind-independent,” that is, it does not depend on anyone’s beliefs
or attitudes about the reasons for acting, even under ideal epistemic conditions.1 I here revisit some
earlier arguments (Leiter 2001; Leiter 2014; Leiter 2015), trying to refine them and respond to possible
objections.
A threshold objection to this strategy of argument deserves brief consideration. Enoch (2009:
23) notes that “[n]ot every phenomenon calls for explanation—we are inclined to take some facts as
brute.” That seems right, but is disagreement a “brute fact” that does not “call” for explanation? Enoch
notes that a “full answer…would have to determine first what makes a phenomenon explanatorily
interesting,” and confesses, “I know of no satisfactory answer to this question” (2009: 23). We do not
need, of course, a full answer to that question, just an answer to the question whether intractable
disagreements should be treated as “brute.” Enoch admits that “declaring all cases of moral
disagreement as explanatorily uninteresting is a rather desperate (and dogmatic) move” (2009: 23).
Let us distinguish between the metaphysical claim that some facts are brute, i.e., that they do
not admit of further explanation, and the epistemological or practical claim that a phenomenon does
not “call” for or warrant an explanation. Many phenomena are brute in the latter sense, but not in the
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former: e.g., that my bread toasts in the toaster each morning, that the car starts when I turn it on, that
my daughter Celia is a terrific cook. None of these phenomena are metaphysically brute, of course, and
they all can be explained, but except in unusual circumstances we have no reason, epistemic or
practical, to seek out such an explanation: they do not “call for” explanation.
Metaphysically brute facts simply do not admit of any further explanation. There may not be
many such facts, though this will likely depend on one’s metaphysics. That we experience time as
moving forward not backwards, that fundamental physics gives us the best account of matter in motion,
that death awaits all living organisms, may all be metaphysically brute facts. The phenomenon of
disagreement is obviously not metaphysically brute in any similar sense.
So Enoch’s challenge should be understood as the demand that we need to articulate when, for
epistemic or practical reasons, we should seek an explanation of a phenomenon. We do not, as noted,
need a general account of “what makes a phenomenon explanatorily interesting,” since it will suffice if
we can identify some features that make a phenomenon explanatorily interesting, and show that
disagreement has those features. I here propose one such feature: when people take themselves to be
trying to discover some objective fact2 about the world, but fail to converge on an answer despite trying
for a long time, it is natural to wonder what explains their failure.
Imagine: you and your neighbors spend hours looking in the backyard for a lost ball; you all think
you know what the ball looks like, and you all profess sincerely wanting to find it. Yet, after fruitless
hours of searching, there is no agreement that it has been found. While some neighbors produce balllike objects, others disagree that that is the ball; still others deny that any candidate “balls” have even
been found. Is it not quite appropriate to ask what the explanation is for this strange state of affairs?
Perhaps the ball is not in the yard; or perhaps there is no ball at all; or perhaps some of the ball hunters
are blind; or perhaps some of the ball hunters have been bribed by those who hid the ball to assist in
An “objective fact” is a mind-independent fact in the following sense: its existence and character does not
depend on the epistemic states of other persons, even under epistemically ideal conditions.
2
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their scheme. All of these could be possible explanations for the disagreement among the ball
searchers, but what seems clear is that some explanation is “called for.”
The situation is the same, I suggest, with regard to trying to figure out the reasons for action we
have. “Reasons for action” may be the au courant philosophical lingo,3 but the entire history of
Western philosophy has been devoted to this question under various descriptions. Consider:
(1) Are reasons for acting culturally relative (the Sophists) or absolute (Plato)?
(2) Are reasons for acting deontological (Kant) or consequentalist (too many to list) or derived from
some other source (Aristotle et al.)?
(3) If reasons for acting are consequentialist in justificatory structure, do they appeal to what
maximizes pleasure (Bentham), happiness (Mill), informed desire-satisfaction (Brandt, Railton)
or something else?
(4) If reasons for acting are deontological in justificatory structure, do they require acting from the
motive of duty, or acting in accordance with the categorical imperative, or showing respect for
persons (a vast literature of intra-sectarian disputes among Kantians)?
(5) Are moral reasons for acting overriding, or do non-moral reasons sometimes (or often) trump
moral reasons (Foot, Williams, Nietzsche, maybe Wolf) or are moral and egoistic reasons for
acting locked in irresolvable conflict (Sidgwick)?
After more than two thousand years, philosophers still cannot find the “ball,” as it were: they do not
agree about what our reasons for acting really are. That is our explanandum. This calls for an
explanation: more precisely, we want to know what is the best explanation?
The “best” explanation of some phenomenon satisfies a variety of epistemic and pragmatic
desiderata,4 ones derived from the successful empirical sciences, which remain our paradigms of fruitful
ways of explaining observable phenomena. These desiderata include: (1) simplicity (especially
3
4

Derek Parfit and Joseph Raz seem to be most responsible for this way of talking.
See Leiter 2001 for an overview; cf. Quine & Ullian, Thagard, Harman

3

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228060
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228060

ontological simplicity), as opposed to gratuitous complexity (i.e., the gratuitous positing of entities that
satisfy no other epistemic or pragmatic desiderata); (2) consilience, that is, the ability to show how
seemingly disparate phenomena have common causes and thus are not really independent, but causally
dependent on the same underlying facts; and (3) conservativism, that is, being consistent with, and thus
not unsettling, other beliefs about the world that have been well-confirmed. This is a non-exhaustive
list, to be sure, but it is on these that I will focus.
Consider: sitting at home, watching a movie on your computer, suddenly the computer goes
off, as do all the lights in the house. What is the best explanation of this phenomenon? Here’s a first
hypothesis: mischievous leprechuans have invaded the house, discovered the circuit breakers, and
flipped them all simultaneously, cutting power to all electrical devices. This explanation does complicate
our ontology: it posits leprechuans, beings who are capable of mounting mischievous attacks, for
example. That would not be objectionable if, for example, there were other observable phenomena
that were satisfactorily explained by such an expansion of our ontology: for example, finding little green
hats in the backyard, or pots of gold at the end of rainbows, or, even better, the corpses of very small
persons dressed in green. But absent that, this first hypothesis would be quite radical: it would add to
our ontology a class of little creatures (are they humans? they seem to have complex cooperative
planning capacities!) that, heretofore, we had no reason to think existed.
Our first hypothesis, in short, is not a good candidate for the best explanation of the
phenomenon that demands explanation. So let us turn to a second hypothesis: there has been an
electrical power failure in the neighborhood. This hypothesis would win additional support from
observable facts like: (1) all items powered by electricity went off simultaneously; perhaps (2) lights and
other electrically powered items went off in neighboring properties; and perhaps (3) there was a
thunderstorm or an electrical explosion that would explain the sudden cessation of electricity to homes
in the area. This explanation, assuming the observable evidence confirms it, would be simple (no new
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ontological entities), consilient (it would explain what happened in the house and in neighboring
properties), and conservative (electricity, power outages, the role of storms in causing them, are all part
of our familiar and going theory of how the world works).
I use this silly example in order to motivate an answer to the question: what is the best
explanation of why philosophers cannot agree on our reasons for action? The analogy is not exact in
lots of ways. But the same kind of “best explanation” phenomenon presents itself. There is in both
cases a fact that everyone agrees upon: in the power outage case, that there is suddenly no electrical
power; in the reasons for action case, that there is no agreement among philosophers about what our
reasons for action really are. What is the “best explanation” of that agreed-upon phenomenon? The
power outage case illustrates, in simple form, some of the relevant considerations.
But let us take a different hypothetical case, with even more structural analogies to our real
topic. A parent takes a group of young children—four or five years old, suppose--to a restaurant to
celebrate a child’s birthday. The children are served a cake, with a rich vanilla icing, and strawberry and
chocolate filling. Some children think it delicious, the best cake they have ever had; others think it
disgusting, indeed inedible; still others eat it, without enthusiasm. Now these are children, prone to
stubborn opinions, convinced of their rectitude and good sense (not like philosophers, of course). The
enthusiastic cake eaters are denounced by their repulsed cake-eating compatriots: “that’s disgusting,
how could you eat that”? The cake enthusiasts are appalled, “What’s wrong with you? This is a great
cake!” The “neutral” consumers are mystified: “Don’t fight,” they say.
I have hosted children’s birthday parties, and I exaggerate only a bit the extremities of reaction,
though that is to be chalked up to bourgeois social norms of politeness that are often inculcated even in
younger children. But the “best explanation” of the birthday party cake is easy: none of the children are
“wrong,” tastes differ, and add to that oddities of child psychology, and the drama is easy to explain.

5
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There is no objective fact about whether or not the birthday cake is good; there are different gustatory
sensibilities, together with facts about child psychology, that explain the conflagration that ensues.
Now let us return to the philosophers. Everyone knows they do not agree about reasons for
action, in the sense that there is no consensus about propositions 1-5 on page three.5 One
contemporary, the late Derek Parfit, thought this a scandal, an indictment of the bona fides of all moral
philosophy, including his own. (Here I agree with him.) His final work was devoted to demonstrating
that all “major” moral philosophers (or at least his friends, plus Nietzsche!6) agreed with his views (or
were not really disagreeing), appearances notwithstanding. No one was convinced,7 though the details
do not matter for my purposes. What I want to emphasize is that even some realists about reasons
think that the failure of philosophers to agree impugns the objectivity of the results.
But why should it? Here is where we come back to inference to the best explanation (IBE)
considerations.8 If two epistemic agents are equally well-situated to cognize certain objective facts, yet
neither one can agree on what those facts are, we may appropriately ask: why do they not agree? One
possible (anti-realist) explanation is that (1) there is no objective fact to be cognized, and (2) judgments
about that putative fact are better-explained by non-epistemic features of agents. (I return to possible
realist hypotheses, below.)
That seems to describe, nicely, the situation in philosophy regarding our real reasons for acting.
Sentimentalists—Hume, Herder, Nietzsche, for example—claim that moral judgments result from the
arousal of emotions in response to certain states of affairs, and that the emotions aroused are not to be
Philosophers do mostly agree about trivial applied propositions that no one has ever disputed, e.g., “No
one has a reason to torture babies for fun.” (As an aside, it’s not clear that certain kinds of internalists about reasons,
like Sharon Street, do agree with this, but put that worry to one side.) Accidental convergence on applied claims
about reasons for action typically belies deeper disagreements about why, say, torturing babies for fun is wrong.
6
Parfit’s chapter on Nietzsche is incompetent, but as a matter of academic sociology, those of us in the
boring Anglophone world interested in Nietzsche can only be grateful that he thought it worth the bother. He sent
me an early version, I sent him detailed comments, but it did not salvage the final product alas. For the problems, cf.
Janaway, Inquiry (2016).
7
Reviews by Schroeder, Blackburn….
8
This is a version of option #4 in Enoch (2009: 21-29); I’ll have more to say about some of his objections
in the text.
5
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explained by their “cognitive detective” capacities (i.e., their ability to pick out features of the world
warranting a particular response) but by psychological facts about persons that are epistemically
insensitive to the “real” moral (or reason-giving) qualities of states of affairs. When sentimentalists
observe a two-thousand-year-long intractable debate among moral philosophers they are hardly
surprised: even moral philosophers are hostage to their psychology, which determines their affective
responses, which determines their intuitive moral judgments, which ultimately determines their moral
philosophies.
Let us now state the argument more precisely:
1.

If there were objective reasons for action, epistemically-well-situated observers would
eventually converge upon them after two thousand years.

2. Contemporary philosophers, as the beneficiaries of two thousand years of philosophy, are
epistemically well-situated observers.
3. Contemporary philosophers have not converged upon reasons for action.
4. Conclusion: there are no objective reasons for action (IBE from the first three premises; the
details of the IBE will be spelled out below).
This argument makes two key assumptions about epistemic access and epistemic capacities: first, it
assumes that if there were objective facts about reasons for action, they would be knowable in
principle by epistemically well-situated agents; and second, it assumes that two thousand years of moral
philosophy should have rendered us epistemically well-situated observers (if it has not, why not?).
An easy way for the realist about reasons to defeat the argument is to deny one or both of the
epistemic assumptions. There are, of course, serious costs to doing so. If one denies the first
assumption, and allows that real reasons for action can be wholly evidence-transcendent, even under
ideal conditions, then one ends up in the same practical place as the anti-realist about reasons. The
anti-realist says there is no such thing as an objective mistake about reasons for acting so one can never
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criticize someone’s reasons as involving an objective mistake; the realist say there is such a thing as an
objective mistake, but we will never know whether anyone is making it so one can never, with
justification, criticize someone’s reasons on those grounds. One need not agree with Marx’s Second
Thesis on Feuerbach (“The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from
practice is a purely scholastic question”) to nonetheless agree that it is a high cost for the realist to allow
that there are practical truths, but, alas, they remain beyond our ken.9
If the realist denies the second assumption, then the realist must consign to irrelevance some
(or perhaps all) of two thousand years of moral philosophy as epistemically inadequate to what our
reasons for action really are. But what could justify doing so? Is there some other method for
discovering real reasons for acting? Holy texts, divine revelations, the words of prophets, the advice of
poets appear to be as deeply in conflict as the views of moral philosophers, but even if they were not,
there is so much other evidence that these sources are epistemically unreliable that they seem poor
contenders as alternatives. If that is right, then this second realist response appears simply ad hoc.
With respect to the possible realist repudiation of the first assumption, we may also ask: what
could justify it, beyond the desire to salvage realism about reasons? Put differently, we may ask
whether the existence of evidence-transcendent practical truths would survive IBE?10 Is there an IBE of
intractable disagreement about reasons for action among philosophers that would include as a premise
the existence of evidence-transcendent practical truths? I am not aware of any, but I invite the realist
who wants to opt for this route to supply one.
This is a natural point at which to spell out the IBE involved in the fourth proposition above:
why is the non-existence of objective reasons for action part of the best explanation of intractable

Cf. Tersman (2006: Ch. 4) discussing arguments in Wright (1992)…
Rowland (2017) offers one argument why there cannot be such practical truths. Arguably Nietzsche does
too with his quip about Kant: “how could something unknown obligate us?” (Twilight of the Idols). My argument
can proceed without defending either of theirs.
9

10
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disagreement among philosophers? Answering this questions requires proffering a full explanation for
this disagreement, which I now set out in terms of the premises to which it is committed.
First Premise: Sentimentalism. Basic intuitive moral judgments (e.g., about the right-making or
good-making features of situations or actions) are caused by basic emotional or affective responses.
Second Premise: Non-cognitivism about affects. The affects involved in basic intuitive moral
judgments have no cognitive component: they have no cognitively evaluable belief component, but
rather a distinctive phenomenal feel. (I will assume, following Nietzsche [Leiter 2013, 2019], that these
affects are primarily ones of inclination and aversion; more on that, below)
Third premise: Philosophical arguments for what our reasons for action are always involve a
premise that depends on a basic intuitive moral judgment.
Fourth premise: Philosophers have not converged on our real reasons for acting.
Conclusion (by IBE): The best explanation for the views philosophers defend are the
psychological and sociological facts that explain their basic affects.
But why is this the best explanation? IBE is a comparative test, so we must have some
competitor explanation for moral disagreement on offer if we are to evaluate the relative merits. Here
is moral realist’s David Enoch explanation of non-philosophical moral disagreement11 which I quote at
some length:
Many moral matters are complex, and not at all straightforward; people are the victims of any
number of cognitive shortcomings…and so that some may be more likely to make moral
mistakes than others; many find it hard—or do not want—to sympathize and imagine what it is
like to occupy a different position in the relevant interaction, and different people are sensitive
to the feelings of others to different degrees; we let our interests influence our beliefs (moral
11

I agree with Enoch (2009: ) and many others (e.g., Brink 1989: __-__) that some moral disagreeents
really mask empirical disagreements, but I do not see that as being at issue in the case I am interested in, i.e.,
intractable disagreement among moral philosophers. Benthamites and Kantians disagree, but they are not
disagreeing about any empirical facts.

9

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228060
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228060

and otherwise); we are subject to the manipulation of others, and so to the distorting effects
also of their self-interests….
Let me draw special attention to one of these kinds of alternative explanation: that in
terms of the distorting effects of self-interest. This kind of explanation is especially important
for at least two reasons: It is extremely powerful, and it helps explain the difference in the
scope of disagreement in morality and in other discourses. (Enoch 2009: 25-26)
Since a central part of what is in dispute in the history of philosophy is whether our real reasons for
action are self- or other-regarding, Enoch’s last point is question-begging, so I will put it to one side. But
even if we discount Sidgwick (who thought the conflict between self-regarding and other-regarding
reasons intractable), as well as the various opponents of Socrates who defended self-regarding reasons
for acting, how would the considerations Enoch adduces fare as an explanation of the disagreement
among the other philosophers for two thousand years about our reasons for action? What cognitive
shortcomings, for example, did Bentham suffer from that Kant did not? What “interests” influenced
Kant that led him to disagree with Bentham? Who “manipulated’ Mill and Aristotle? (And, as Kant
would instruct us, “sympathizing” with someone is not a sound basis for determining one’s moral
obligations anyway!)
Enoch’s points seem unlikely candidates to explain away the intractable disagreement about
reasons for action that characterize the history of Western philosophy (even if they have some purchase
in the case of non-philosophical disagreement). But does the anti-realist explanation sketched above
fare better? I shall argue it does.
First, the empirical evidence in support of sentimentalism (the first premise) is very strong. As a
recent literature survey notes, individuals “with selective deficits in emotional processing” due to
disease or injury to the brain render different moral judgments about hypothetical situation like the
Trolley cases, than most emotionally normal subjects to hypothetical situations (Cushman et al. 2010:
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53-54), suggesting that the affective responses are causes of the moral judgments. Psychologist and
philosopher Joshua Greene (2007) has argued that emotional responses loom larger in deontological
than consequentialist moral judgments, the latter demanding more “controlled cognition” (Cushman et
al. 2010: 54), but in more recent work even Greene has acknowledged that “affect supplies the primary
motivation to view harm as a bad thing” in the first place, so that even consequentialist reasoning has
“an affective basis” (Cushman et al. 2010: 62).12 In another recent review of the empirical literature,
Timothy Schroeder, Adina Roskies and Shaun Nichols found that the view they dub “sentimentalism”—
namely, the view that “the emotions typically play a key causal role in motivating moral behavior”
(Schroeder et al. 2010: 77)—is well-supported by the “evidence from psychology and neuroscience”
(Schroeder et al. 2010: 98), and that while “motivation derived [exclusively] from higher cognitive
centers independently of desire is possible…the only known model of it is pathological” involving
Torrette syndrom (Schroeder et al. 2010: 94). In sum, the empirical evidence supports the claim that
sentimentalism is part of a consilient explanation of the phenomenon of moral judgment.13
Second, non-cognitivism about basic affects (the second premise) is also highly plausible,
psychologically and philosophically. Here let me focus on Nietzsche’s version of this view. In Daybreak,
Nietzsche says “moral feelings” (Moralische Gefühle) are inculcated when “children observe in adults
inclinations for and aversions to certain actions and, as born apes, imitate these inclinations
[Neighungen] and aversions [Abneighungen]; in later life they find themselves full of these acquired and
well-exercised affects [Affekten] and consider it only decent to try to account for and justify them” (D
34). We may bracket the astute concluding observation—about the impulse to supply post-hoc
12

More precisely, “affect supplies the primary motivation to regard harm as bad. Once this primary
motivation is supplied, reasoning proceeds in a currency-like manner [“currency emotions are designed to
participate in the process of practical reasoning”]” (Cushman et al. 2010: 63). “[A]larm-bell emotions are
designed to circumvent reasoning” (id. at 62) and, arguably, this is “the origin of the welfare principle,” namely “in
“Parkinson disease appears to show that intrinstic desires are necessary to the production of motivation in normal
human beings, and this would seem to put serious pressure on the cognitivist position” (93)
13

Note that sentimentalism could be true and well-supported by empirical evidence, but that could be
compatible with moral realism.
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rationalizations for evaluative judgments produced by a non-rational mechanism—in order to focus on
its picture of basic affects. Moral feelings or affects are equated with “inclinations for and aversions to
certain actions,” or, more precisely, with the mental state, whatever it is, that motivates one to perform
certain actions or avoid certain other actions.

It is surely plausible that any credible ontology of the

mind includes mental states that are motivationally effective, at least in the sense that they produce
what I will call henceforth motivational oomph (or push), that is, they incline towards or avert away from
certain acts, even if they are not ultimately successful in producing action. We typically presume, of
course, that affects or feelings are characterized, in part, by their ability to produce motivational oomph,
and, indeed, the fact that they do so is one of the main points thought to count in favor of views, like
sentimentalism, that understand moral judgments to involve essentially the expression of feelings.
It is equally a part of ordinary usage to take feelings to have another crucial characteristic:
namely, that they are phenomenologically distinctive. There is something it feels like to be inclined to
stop the child from sticking his hand in the fire, and there is something it feels like to be inclined to avoid
killing a child. A non-cognitivist view of affects claims that they can be fully individuated by their
distinctive phenomenal feel; a cognitivist view denies that, claiming, instead, that to individuate the
affect one also needs to consider some aspect of its cognitive (i.e., truth-evaluable) content, such as a
belief. Cognitivist views of emotions, notoriously, are forced to deny that human infants can have
emotions, since they lack the concepts necessary for having truth-evaluable judgments (cf. Deigh 1994).
That infants cannot have emotions is, by my lights (as someone who has cared at length for three
infants!), a reductio of the cognitivist position. But less anecdotally, cognitivism about the emotions
runs up against a large body of psychological research showing that, as Jesse Prinz puts it, “emotions
can arise without judgment, thoughts, or other cognitive mediators” (2007: 57). While it may be
doubtful that qualitative feel can distinguish all emotional states (Prinz’s example is differentiating
“anger” from “indignation” [2007: 52]), that is not relevant here: the question is, following Nietzsche’s
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proposal, that the affective source of moral judgment, in the first instance, consists in fairly basic or
simple mental states of inclination and aversion, and it seems quite plausible that there is something it
feels like to be inclined towards X or averted away from Y, even if the relevant qualia might be thought
inadequate to pick out all conceptual nuances we might want to apply to such cases. It is also possible,
of course, that our conceptually nuanced distinctions between, say, anger and indignation are
explanatorily otiose with respect to the motivational oomph associated with the feeling in question.
But what about the most common worry about non-cognitivist views of feelings or affects,
namely, how can they account for our propensity to think emotional responses can be assessed as
warranted or not (cf. Prinz 2007: 60ff.)? Even in infants, of course, emotional responses have causal
triggers: the infant sees a scary “monster” and reacts by crying in fear. The infant’s fear has an
intentional content: it is about something, namely, the scary monster. We might believe the infant is
wrong to be afraid (i.e., what the infant sees is not dangerous, since it is only make-believe), but that
does not change the fact that the infant experiences upset and fear. I believe that a child is about to
stick his hand in the flame, and so I feel inclined to stop him. “Feel inclined” understates the character
of the feeling, of course: I feel I must stop him. But the fact that there is a causal relationship between
a mental state with cognitive content and an affective response, does not show that to identify the
affect one must understand it to be constituted, in whole or even in part, by a cognitive component. We
need to account for the intentionality of emotions, to be sure, but that does not mean we have to
identify emotions with judgments. It might suffice to introduce a kind of explanatorily primitive mental
state, as Peter Goldie (2002: 19) famously proposes, like “feeling towards,” one that capture both the
intentionality of emotional states and their distinctive qualitative character.
So feeling inclined to do X or averse to doing Y can have a distinctive phenomenal character,
even if the causal trigger for the feeling is a false belief of the agent with the distinctive feeling. When
we criticize the resulting emotion, perhaps, then, we are making a different normative judgment,
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something like: a correct belief about the facts ought not cause such an affective response. Consider:
the infant falsely perceives (without any conceptual content) the family dog as dangerous, and so bursts
into tears. We think the infant is mistaken, because we know that the family dog is not dangerous. But
we don’t criticize the infant for having an unwarranted affective response, rather we console the infant.
Why? Perhaps because we don’t think the infant is epistemically responsible for its false cognition of the
family dog as dangerous. But when I react with anger to a perceived slight by the store clerk that, in
reality, was nothing of the kind, I can be criticized not because anger is anything other than noncognitive, and not because my “belief that I’ve been slighted” is a causal trigger for my anger, but
because I am epistemically culpable for having a false belief, one that produces unhappy consequences
(my anger, a fight with the clerk at the store, an unpleasant scene, etc.). (Note that anti-realism about
epistemic judgment is a live option: cf. Field 2009.)
Yet it seems I can also be criticized for responding with anger even when my belief was correct,
i.e., when the store clerk really was rude. How can that criticism make sense if the cognitive belief is
just a causal trigger for an evaluative/affective response that has no cognitive content? The obvious
answer is that such judgments are, themselves, the expression of other non-cognitive attitudes or
feelings, such as an inclination towards non-aggressive responses to insults or an aversion to aggressive
ones (we might call the latter the “Christian attitude”). Of course, if we view such criticism as making a
cognitive, rather than non-cognitive, claim, then we will be forced towards an error-theoretic
interpretation of such judgments (that is, we will have to interpret all such judgments as false) or some
more complicated non-cognitive (in the semantic sense) interpretation of them. Thus, the noncognitivist about basic affects of inclination and aversion can claim that our basic affects of inclination
and aversion are marked by a distinctive conscious, qualitative feel; that these feels are the causal root
of our moral judgments; and the social practice of assessing such feelings as warranted or unwarranted
can be compatible with the non-cognitive character of the feeling because to deem them warranted or
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unwarranted is either (1) to render an epistemic judgment (perhaps itself amenable to anti-realist
treatment) about the cognitive judgment that is the causal trigger for the non-cognitive state, or (2) to
express a meta-affect (i.e., an affect about an affect) about someone else’s affective response to a
causal trigger. In sum, non-cognitivism about basic affects offers a simple and conservative explanation
of the crucial claims in the sentimentalist hypothesis about moral judgment.14
The third premise makes a claim about the logical structure of arguments for reasons for action
that seems hard to dispute: such arguments depend on a premise that appeals to what is supposed to
be intuitively plausible. Now the “Kantian” loosely construed—that is, someone who thinks rational
action itself, either as a matter of logic (e.g., arguably Kant or Gewirth) or its constitutive character (e.g.,
Korsgaard or Velleman), supplies the crucial normative premise—will deny that intuition is at issue, as
opposed to the demands of rationality or action. I shall simply record my view that these arguments
are implausible, so much so that Gewirth’s has no defenders anymore, and Korsgaard’s and Velleman’s
constitutivism will, one hopes, go the same way (see Enoch 2006). With apologies to members of this
particular Kantian sect, I will say nothing further about these views.15
The fourth premise notes the key explanandum we have been discussing throughout:
philosophers do not agree about reasons for acting.
Now we are ready for the anti-realist inference to the best explanation. Since philosophers
develop arguments that depend on key intuitive premises, that are non-cognitive, but explicable in
14
Someone might worry that it is not at all “conservative,” but radically revisionary of ordinary “folk”
beliefs, to tell people that there is (as Nethanel Lipshitz aptly put it to me) “no such thing as good and evil,” and that
there is nothing they objectively have a reason to do or not do. But this kind of worry involves a misunderstanding
of conservativism as a demand on choosing better and worse explanations. We should be conservative with our
explanations vis-à-vis well-confirmed theories and beliefs about the world, not about folk beliefs and intuitions,
which are (outside, say, judgments about midsize physical objects) a notorious hodgepodge of falsehood, delusion
and wish-fulfillments.
15
Weber’s point a century ago about specialization as increasingly essential to Wissenschaft in the
universities has wreaked particular havoc in philosophy, since, as a university discipline, it still aims to be a
Wissenschaft (unlike certain other fields in the so-called “humanities” like English) yet is obviously hostage to the
intuitions or “common sense” of its practitioners, an interesting sociological and anthropological artifact to be sure.
But the combination of specialization, the need for appearing wissenschaftlich, and the dependence on epistemically
feeble data points like “intuitions” explains some of the peculiarities of recent professional philosophy—these may
even provide the “best explanation”!
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terms of facts about the psychology and sociology of those who make the judgments, it should hardly be
surprising that their philosophical systems are locked in intractable conflict, since their arguments
depend, both logically and causally, on views that are psycho-social artifacts that vary with person, time
and place.16 Bentham thinks it intuitively obvious that the experience of pain is the most morally salient
fact; Kant (on certain readings) thinks it intuitively obvious that the motive for action is the most morally
salient fact. What would an argument for either premise look like that did not already presuppose the
intuition?
Recall the children at the birthday party. Child A says, “The cake is disgusting, you ought not eat
it!” Child B says, “The cake is delicious, eat it!” Child A, with some help from a philosopher, explains
that (1) chocolate and strawberry are a revolting combination of flavors; (2) any combination of flavors
that is revolting ought not be eaten; therefore (3) the cake should not be eaten. Child B, with the help
of another philosopher, retorts: (1) chocolate and strawberry are a delightful combination of flavors; (2)
any combination of flavors that is delightful ought to be eaten; therefore (3) the cake should be eaten.
Their debate is intractable because a crucial premise in their argument—the first premise—is
determined by their gustatory sensibilities, an artifact of each child’s psychology (perhaps also biology)
and upbringing. There is no objective fact of the matter about whether chocolate and strawberry
combined are delicious or not.
The intractable debate among philosophers about reasons for action has the same explanatory
structure.17 The disputants depend on a premise that is determined not, of course, by their gustatory

16

Max Etchemendy points out to me that there is another IBE in the offing here, which accepts my first
three premises, but adds one more, namely, that basic affective responses are not amenable to change through
argumentation in seminar rooms or in the pages of philosophy journals. That, too, would explain the failure of
convergence among contemporary philosophers, but without taking a position on realism vs. anti-realism about
reasons. It would, of course, entail that moral philosophy is irrelevant, and so, in that regard, is a version of the first
realist rejoinder considered earlier, i.e., affirming that the truth about reasons for acting transcends what we can
know about them. But that raises the question why we should think that is the explanation for the failure of
convergence.
17
The realist may here object that a key difference is that while adult observers will agree that the children
are wrongly disputing mere matters of taste in the cake case, they will not so view their moral disagreements.
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sensibilities, but by facts about their psychology and sociology: their sensitivity, their stamina, their
openness, their neuroticism, their upbringing, their peer environment, etc.. That premise is nonnegotiable, but itself has no cognitive status, and so cannot be refuted by logic or evidence. Let us
recall, for example, that Derek Parfit’s parents were Christian missionaries; that John Rawls had planned
to be an Episcopal priest; that Joseph Raz’s father was a Rabbi; and, more recently, that Rae Langton’s
parents were Christian missionaries. Are these facts about some contemporary moral philosophers
really irrelevant to their moral philosophies?
Presumably even the realist will admit these psycho-social facts are relevant, the question is
whether these facts about the prosaic origins of philosophers’ central moral intuitions are part of the
best explanation of why they end up disagreeing with each other? Of course, the disagreements among
products of Judeo-Christian indoctrination can look like the narcissism of small differences compared to
the disagreement between recent Western moral philosophy and Nietzsche or Homer or the rest of the
world, so perhaps we should pause for a moment to mention the more dramatic cases of disagreement.
The standard-issue academic Anglophone philosopher thinks it intuitively obvious that
“suffering is bad” or that “humans are possessed of dignity which precludes harming them” or some
other familiar formulation. My argument is that, however much affection readers have for one or both
of these premises, they are nothing more than affectively-induced intuitions that tell us more about
“socialization”18 than about reality.
Someone part of the Homeric world—or perhaps the Mafia more recently?--would find these
purportedly intuitively obvious claims bizarre. Suffering is essential to glory and honor, it is not

Assuming that is true (the evidence is mixed—consider the economists’ talk of “preferences,” which is ubiquitous in
the neoclassical tradition), that simply raises the question what best explains such a meta- view about the status of
moral disagreements. It is not clear to me the explanation is really that different in either case, though the habit of
academic philosophers of talking only to each other perhaps encourages a different judgment.
18
I use the term “socialization” very loosely to capture all those psycho-social facts about persons that
explain their moral judgments per the IBE sketched earlier.
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objectionable but welcome.19 Loyalty and the ability to exact revenge are far more important than
suffering, and individuals can be harmed when honor, glory or revenge demands it. It is not simply that
all of human history reveals the powerful role of this competing set of norms, but that there is no
refutation of commitment to them that does not presuppose a premise involving a different affective
commitment. These norms can be coherently formulated and applied and they play, as much as we
observers might regret it, an enormous role in human affairs.
Most academics have a profound affective identification with the intuitions at the foundation of
both the Kantian and utilitarian traditions (I find myself moved by aspects of both).20 Glory, honor,
revenge and loyalty lack academic defenders, but that is not to be regretted, since those normative
ideals thrive and structure lives without academic philosophers writing in support. But calling attention
to them indicates the diversity of views about reasons for action that have gripped human minds.
To be sure, the realist might retort that the appeal of glory or revenge as a reason for acting is
vulnerable to being explained away, perhaps along precisely the lines Enoch proposed originally. Recall
Enoch:
Many moral matters are complex, and not at all straightforward; people are the victims of any
number of cognitive shortcomings…and so that some may be more likely to make moral
mistakes than others; many find it hard—or do not want—to sympathize and imagine what it is
like to occupy a different position in the relevant interaction, and different people are sensitive
to the feelings of others to different degrees; we let our interests influence our beliefs (moral

19

Someone might object that even those committed to the view that suffering is bad and that inflicting
suffering is wrong can allow that those are defeasible normative considerations, and so in fact the Homeric hero is
not disagreeing. That could be true if there were evidence that the Homeric hero’s “practical reasoning” worked this
way: but, first, Homeric heroes don’t engage in much practical reasoning (at least not as Homer presents them), and
second, there is no indication that Homeric heroes are committed to the wrongness of suffering being a normative
consideration that needs to be defeated.
20
I put to one side Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians with their fanciful assumptions about what it means to
be human: they have the distinct advantage of not regarding empirical evidence from the natural and human
sciences of what humans are actually like as having any bearing on their ideas.
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and otherwise); we are subject to the manipulation of others, and so to the distorting effects
also of their self-interests…. (Enoch 2009: 25-26)
Remember that our topic is reasons for action, not simply “moral” reasons for action as conceived
within a particular parochial tradition, say, the Kantian or utilitarian. But to evaluate Enoch’s
alternative, let us take as an example Odysseus, who is celebrated by Homer for his talents at deception
and his capacity to exact revenge. Odysseus, recall, returns after his long journey to find suitors in his
home trying to seduce his faithful wife Penelope. Disguised as a beggar, Odysseus is the only one strong
enough to string his old bow (the challenge put to the suitors by Penelope), at which point he slaughters
the other suitors in revenge.
Has Odysseus made a mistake about his reasons for acting? Did he fail to “sympathize and
imagine what it is like to occupy a different position in the interaction”? Let us grant that this is, in fact,
a legitimate demand on reasons for acting, though it looks dangerously close to assuming, without
argument, that possibly self-regarding reasons (like honor) are out of bounds. But it is easy enough to
imagine that Odysseus would reason as follows: “Were I to be found out trying to seduce another
man’s wife during his absence, he would be right to slaughter me.” Was Odysseus insufficiently
“sensitive to the feelings of others”? Again, let us grant that this consideration is even relevant to his
reasons for acting. Has he really failed to be “sensitive to the feelings of others”? The feelings of others
are, presumably on any view about reasons for action, a defeasible consideration: it no doubt hurt
Donald Trump’s feelings that residents of London flew a giant balloon of a “Baby Donald” over the city
during his recent visit to the country, yet his feelings were not a reason for the protesters not to do that.
Even if Odysseus does not give much weight at all to the no -doubt strong preference of the suitors not
to be slaughtered, this does not mean he gave it no weight: Odysseus surely knows his suitors would
prefer not to be victims of his revenge. Yet he could reason, without error, as follows: “to try to marry a
man’s faithful wife while he is away engaged in an arduous life-and-death struggle for a worthy cause is
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an offense to honor and decency, and anyone who embarks on such a path has forfeited his claim to
have his wish to live respected.”
Of course, that reasoning would be in error if one granted a premise like “inflicting death on
others for the sake of revenge is always wrong” or, alternatively, “inflicting death on others to avenge
their wrongful actions is always wrong.” But Odysseus accepts neither premise, not because either is
false, but because the psychological and sociology of his own upbringing leaves him with no affective
inclination toward accepting these premises such that they should influence his practical reasoning.21
Odysseus disagrees with the reasons for acting that seem decisive to we moderns because his
psychology and sociology are different, not because there is an objective reason for him not to slaughter
the suitors of Penelope--or, for that matter, an objective reason for him to slaughter them.
A realist might protest that the best explanation of why we judge Odysseus’s reasons for acting
mistaken is precisely that we are sensitive to the infliction of death on sentient beings for trivial reasons,
and that any action with that attribute is a token instance of “moral wrongness”: yes, we were brought
up to be sensitive to that, but in so being raised, we were raised to be sensitive to actual moral
wrongdoing! Now in order not to beg the question we have to ask whether the thesis that “moral
wrongdoing” is identical with or supervenient upon, among other things, inflicting death on sentient
beings for revenge, would be part of the best explanation of the Odysseus/contemporary dispute? The
anti-realist explanation, recall, appeals to psychological and sociological facts, and their historical,
cultural and temporal variation; the realist explanation presumably does not deny any of those facts but
then adds a further fact, namely, that killing for revenge is a case of objective moral wrongness. Does
that additional metaphysical thesis, which certainly makes our ontology less simple, make the
explanation more consilient? What else does it help us explain? I have argued elsewhere that such an

As noted, above supra n. 17, I do not think Odysseus actually engages in “practical reasoning,” rather
than acting instinctively. But this is a separate debate: for skepticism about practical reason, see my discussion of
Nietzsche’s view (Leiter 2019: Ch. 5).
21
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assumption has no consilience benefits at all.22 Is it a methodologically conservative assumption? It
would be if our best-going theory of the world already required that there be objective facts about
reasons, but there is no evidence I can see that it does.23 Anti-realism about reasons for acting is
rampant in all the social (as well as physical) sciences; it is only some philosophers (and theologians)
who think there are objective reasons for acting.
Realists about reasons have developed many “defusing explanations” (Doris & Plakias 2007: 311,
320-321; cf. Loeb 1998 for a useful survey and rebuttal of various strategies) to block the abductive
inference from apparently intractable disagreement about our reasons for acting to skepticism about
objective reasons. Disagreement, as I have acknowledged throughout, is an epistemic phenomenon,
from which we propose to draw a metaphysical conclusion. The ‘defusing’ explanations of such
disagreement propose to exploit that fact, by suggesting alternate epistemic explanations for the
disagreement, many of which I have already touched upon. Here I want to comment on one residual
defusing explanation.
Perhaps, this defusing argument goes, disagreements about reasons for action are not really
intractable, but resolvable in principle. This has been the standard optimistic refrain from philosophers
ever since “moral realism” was revived as a serious philosophical position in Anglophone philosophy in
the 1980s. With respect to very particularized moral disagreements—e.g., about questions of economic
or social policy—which often trade on obvious factual ignorance or disagreement about complicated
empirical questions, this seems a plausible retort. But for over two hundred years, Kantians and
utilitarians have been developing increasingly systematic versions of their respective positions. The
Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy has an even longer history. Utilitarians have become
22

Leiter (2001) argues at length that the ontological complexity produces no explanatory payoffs, criticizing
claims to the contrary by Brink, J. Cohen, and Sayre-McCord, among others.
23
Enoch (2009: 27) mischaracterizes the issue when he says (correctly) that “[c]ompeting explanations are
evaluated holistically and against a background of prior beliefs,” but then says (falsely) that competing explanations
of moral disagreement will “depend on whether we were metaethical realists to being with.” But holistic forms of
justification, informed by conservativism, do not assume that just any “prior beliefs” count: it is the “prior beliefs”
that we already have good IBE reasons to think are true! But our prior beliefs about realism about reasons for action
are precisely what is at issue in the IBE argument, so we cannot presuppose such beliefs in evaluating competing
explanations.

21

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228060
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228060

particularly adept at explaining how they can accommodate Kantian and Aristotelian intuitions about
particular cases and issues, though in ways that are usually found to be systematically unpersuasive to
the competing traditions and which, in any case, do nothing to dissolve the disagreement about the
underlying moral criteria and categories. Philosophers in each tradition increasingly talk only to each
other, without even trying to convince those in the other traditions.24 And while there may well be
‘progress’ within traditions—e.g., most utilitarians regard Mill as an improvement on Bentham—there
does not appear to be any progress in moral theory, in the sense of a consensus that particular
fundamental theories of right action and the good life are deemed better than their predecessors. What
we find now are simply the competing traditions—Kantian, Humean, Millian, Aristotelian, Thomist,
perhaps now even Nietzschean--which often view their competitors as unintelligible or morally obtuse,
but don’t have any actual arguments against the foundational premises of their competitors. There is,
in short, no sign—I can think of none—that we are heading towards any epistemic rapprochement
between these competing moral traditions. So why exactly are we supposed to be optimistic?
As grounds for optimism, many philosophers appeal to the thought (due to Derek Parfit) that
secular “moral theory” is a young field, so of course it has not made much progress. This strikes me as
implausible for several reasons. First, most fields with factual subject matters have usually managed to
make progress, as measured by convergence among researchers, over the course of a century—and
especially the last century, with the rise of research universities. Moral theory is, again, the odd man
out, when compared to physics, chemistry, biology, or mathematics.25 Even psychology, the most

The one partial exception is Parfit’s last work, though the extent to which it really engages the competing
views is open for some doubt: cf. the reviews cited in n. __.
25
It is natural to worry that the problem of intractable disagreement is not limited just to moral
philosophy: is not the same the apparently intractable disagreement mirrored in many other parts of our
discipline? Are not metaphysicians and epistemologists also not locked in intractable disagreements of their own?
Think of debates between internalists and externalists in epistemology, or between presentists and fourdimensionalists in the philosophy of time. If disagreement among moral philosophers supports an abductive
inference to denying the existence of moral facts, what, if anything, blocks that inference in all these other cases?
Some writers think this kind of “companions in guilt” consideration counts in favor of moral realism,
notwithstanding the disagreement among moral philosophers. It is not entirely clear why they rule out, however,
the other natural conclusion. Of course, we would need to think carefully about individual cases of philosophical
disagreement, since not all of them, in all branches of philosophy, are as intractable or as foundational as they are
24
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epistemically robust of the ‘human’ sciences, managed to make progress: e.g., the repudiation of
behaviorism, and the cognitive turn in psychology in just the last fifty years. Second, Spinoza, Hume, Mill
and Sidgwick (among many others) may not have advertised their secularism, but the idea that their
moral theories are for that reason discontinuous with the work of the past hundred years does obvious
intellectual violence to the chains of influence of ideas and arguments. Third, and relatedly, so-called
“secular” moral theory regularly conceives itself in relation to a history that stretches back in time
(sometimes back to the Greeks)—contrast that with the relative youth of modern physics!--so that it
becomes unclear why the bogeyman of the deity was supposed to have constituted the insuperable
obstacle weighing down intellectual progress. Most contemporary deontologists may be atheists, for
example, but it is not obvious that their atheism enabled them to make stunning intellectual progress
beyond Kant.26
Psychological and sociological facts are part of the ontology of the social sciences already;
objective facts about reasons for acting are a significant addition. Unfortunately, it is unclear that
adding such facts offers any explanatory advantages. Such an ontological add-on seems to fare

in moral philosophy. Some philosophical disagreements can, in fact, be defused fairly easily. Thus, to take an
example from one of my other fields, the debate in legal philosophy between natural law theorists and legal
positivists about the nature of law has both an element of tractability (natural law theorists like Finnis have, in fact,
conceded most of the claims that actually matter to legal positivism as a theory of law) and admits, in the
intractable parts, of defusing by reference to the transparent and dogmatic religious commitments of the natural
law theorists on the remaining issues they refuse to cede. In sum, the skeptical argument from disagreement
among philosophers may have implications beyond moral philosophy, but what precisely they are will have to be
decided on a case-by-case basis. (I discuss this issue in a bit more detail in Leiter [2014].)
26

Alastair Norcross suggests to me that the real problem is that ethics requires reliance on “intuitions,” and
our intuitions are still strongly tainted by our religious traditions. That seems a more plausible point, though it is
unclear what criteria we are going to appeal to in order to sort the “tainted” from “untainted” intuitions. As
Nietzsche would be the first to point out, the utilitarian obsession with sentience and suffering is, itself, indebted to
Christianity—an ironic fact, given the centrality of the wrongness of suffering to Parfit’s own moral philosophy
(e.g., 2011b, pp. 565 ff.).
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especially poorly in helping us understand the history of philosophy, which is the history of intractable
dispute about reasons for acting.27
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